Egypt

Egypt's Liberals Draft 12-Point Charter Of The Covenant

Via An Arab Citizen - , by Basem Sabry--مواطن عربي

Egypt's Liberals Draft 12-Point Charter Of The Covenant

As liberal and secular-leaning political forces continue to find themselves in a bit of a bind over whether or not to support the MB's presidential candidate Mohammed Morsi in the runoffs against former regime candidate Ahmed Shafiq, one idea was to present a proposal with the minimum set of acceptable promises that Morsi had to agree to before winning their endorsement. However, that idea has been taken and instead presented to the public at large, up for grabs by either, or both, candidate. The problem is that it means that some of them are implying they might theoretically consider endorsing Shafiq or that, at least, they are pitting Shafiq against Morsi so as to enter a bidding war. Not necessarily the most tactful move if you want to maintain your pro-revolution credentials and build a vital long-term relationship with the country's largest political group. Still, I understand that perhaps they are trying to generate the biggest possible public pressure, which is unquestionably needed.

Al-Watan, Egypt's newest newspaper, and Al-Ahram both have different presentations of how the document is like, as neither of them actually published the charter itself. We seem to know the following:

- It reaffirms article two of the 1971 constitution as it stands, stipulating that Islam is the religion of the state, Arabic is the official language and that the "principles of the Islamic Shari'a are the main source of legislation," while demanding the addition of: "with non-Muslims having the right to refer to their own laws (literally: Shari'as)) The previous interpretations of the article by the Supreme Court would be upheld.

- Calls for the application of the Universal Declaration On Human Rights, reaffirms the principle of equal citizenship, denounces discrimination and practices such as the accusation of others of apostasy.

- Stresses the importance of the separation of powers, the independence of the judiciary.

- Before the elections runoff, the willing candidate must announce a "presidential team" with multiple VPs who have real influence.

- Negotiations on a coalition government must begin now, which would include youth, different political groups, women, copts.

- Al-Azhar becomes the only official reference on Islamic matters.

- Equal rights in the construction of house of worship and in the practice of religious rituals.

- Promises to facilitate the regular peaceful transfer of power.

- A fairer composition for the constituent assembly in charge of writing the constitution. Only 35 out of 100 members would come from parties represented in the parliament by at least 5 sears, and they should be divided equally among those different parties and political groups, with the remaining 65 coming from different national groups. Decisions would be taken by two/thirds majority.

- The collective practice of politics should be done through official parties, and not through organisations or groups with sectarian bases.

- Demands the replacement of the (Orwellian) Ministry Of Information with a National Council For Media/Information (BBC-like structure.)

- Ensures the right to peaceful protest and public "resistance and revolution," says Ahram.

- Insists on social justice and the empowerment of underprivileged groups in society.

The "United Civil Current," which wrote this document, included participation by SDP head Mohammed Abul-Ghar, Hazem Al-Biblawy, Sameh Ashour and others (including some alleged and unspecified participation or attendance of deliberation by presidential candidates Amr Moussa and Khaled Ali), and was drafted by Constitutional Expert Nour Farahat

via anarabcitizen.blogspot.ca

20,000 police, 160 tanks to secure Mubarak trial ahead of verdict

Via Egypt Independent

Photographed by AFP

In anticipation of a violent reaction to former President Hosni Mubarak's sentencing, officials unveiled a plan to secure the Saturday session of his trial that includes the deployment of 160 tanks and thousands of police officers.

Security sources told Al-Masry Al-Youm that a bomb squad would examine the special Police Academy courtroom dedicated to the trial 24 hours before the 2 June session.

Security forces will also use bomb-sniffing dogs, electronic gates and metal detectors, according to a plan the Interior Ministry approved Wednesday. More than 20,000 police officers and 60 tanks will surround the academy in Cairo's Fifth Settlement and 100 tanks will be stationed inside the grounds.

Former Interior Minister Habib al-Adly and six high-ranking security officials are facing trial alongside Mubarak for the alleged involvement in killing protesters during the 18-day uprising last January and February that ended Mubarak’s three-decade rule. More than 850 people were killed during those 18 days and thousands were injured.

The former president, his sons Gamal and Alaa Mubarak, and businessman Hussein Salem were also tried for corruption in a separate case heard during the same proceedings, which began last summer.

The prosecution has requested the death penalty for Mubarak, a punishment usually carried out by hanging in Egypt. Mubarak's defense team plans to appeal a potential guilty verdict.

Although Mubarak has typically been transported by helicopter to the makeshift court, the security plan for Saturday's session includes protecting the roads surrounding the International Medical Center where Mubarak has been detained and received medical treatment throughout the trial.

Heavy security is also expected on roads that other defendants will travel. According to the plan, the courtroom will be evacuated once the judge reads the ruling and the defendants will transported to their places of detention.

The same sources said arrangements have been made for a possible attack on prisons.

via www.egyptindependent.com

Thursday’s papers: State of emergency ends, petrol crisis ensues

Via Egypt Independent, by Nadine Marroushi

Photographed by Islam Farouk

The expiration of Egypt’s state of emergency, a continued faceoff between the two remaining presidential candidates and another round of a petrol crisis are the dominant themes in Thursday’s papers.

A state of emergency that has been in place for decades, and used by both the Mubarak regime and the transition’s military rulers to repress dissent and commit widespread human rights abuses, ends today. It will be the responsibility of Parliament to decide whether or not to extend it.

Privately owned Al-Shorouk celebrates this occasion by stating boldly on its front page: “Today, Egypt is without ‘emergency.’” It goes on to say, though, that this doesn’t end the army’s role in maintaining law and order inside Egypt, particularly with two important political events still taking place: deposed president Hosni Mubarak’s trial and verdict on Saturday, and the runoff round of the presidential election in mid-June.

Judge Tahani al-Gebali, deputy head of the Supreme Constitutional Court, is quoted in the story as pointing to the army’s role in the constitution, which designates the military as one of the state’s tools for protecting its borders, as well as internal security if police forces cannot do so.

Al-Shorouk also provides background on the history of Egypt’s state of emergency on page four. It explains that such a state is usually applied in exceptional circumstances, such as wars or cases that cannot be dealt with using the country’s normal laws. Egyptians have been subject to this and Martial Lawon and off from the time of the British administrative period. After former President Anwar Sadat’s assassination in 1981 it was renewed every year until 1988. Its extension was then renewed every three years, Al-Shorouk reports.

The Muslim Brotherhood’s party paper, Freedom and Justice, points out that there have been 30,000 political prisoners under the state of emergency. Its three quarter-page spread on page seven quotes a number of analysts, including constitutional scholar Atef al-Banna, Islamic Labor Party member Diaa al-Sawy and activist Ali al-Fil, who offer assurances that law and order can be maintained in the country without this extraordinary legislative state of affairs. It explains that its use has mainly been to suppress political opposition and freedom of expression, particularly in the war against Islamists under Mubarak. The report says that 99 percent of the state of emergency’s use was for this purpose, and the remaining 1 percent to tackle drug use and terrorism.  

The paper also prominently displays its presidential candidate Mohamed Morsy’s new slogan for the runoff: “Our strength is in our unity.” His slogan for the first round was “Renaissance is the will of the people.” Ahmed Abdel Atta, of Morsy’s campaign, explains the new slogan is to extend bridges of cooperation between the campaign and all Egyptians who belong to the revolution.

The new slogan and its intention is no doubt a reflection of the fact that the race is now between an Islamist candidate, whose party already dominates Parliament, and a figure that represents the old regime — Ahmed Shafiq. It is not certain that all voters who voted for non-feloul [remnants of the Mubarak regime] candidates will automatically give their votes to Morsy, whose party many believe has turned its back on many of the revolution’s demands. Nevertheless, the new slogan appears to be appealing to this voter base.

Privately owned Al-Tahrir is critical of the new slogan, saying it was stolen from Mohamed ElBaradei’s campaign. ElBaradei, who was a leading opposition activist in the lead-up to the 25 January revolution, and who many expected to run for president, is being wooed by the Muslim Brotherhood to lead a coalition government.

Al-Shorouk’s Islamist columnist Fahmy Howeidy likens the race between Shafiq and Morsy to what the Americans did to Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat in 1988, when they refused to deal with him and thus eventually pressured him into accepting the legitimate right of Israel to exist and give up on armed Palestinian resistance. He says that "blackmailing" Morsy’s campaign into making difficult concessions in order to gain their political support will only strengthen Shafiq’s campaign. He warns that this will not only be a loss for Morsy’s campaign, but “the nation and revolution.”

"Petrol queues return ... and those responsible exchange accusations," state-owned Al-Ahram reports on its front page. Cairo and a number of other governorates are suffering from slower-than-usual moving traffic as a result of long queues at petrol stations. Solar and benzene 80 are in short supply. This comes during the wheat cultivation season, in which there is higher than usual use of transportation.

An unnamed source at the state-owned Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation tells Al-Ahram that the main reason for the shortage is a lack of cash to purchase these products. Finance Minister Momtaz al-Saeed defended himself by saying that the ministry has the money, but will only provide this once petroleum corporation uses all its available resources. Mahmoud Balbagh, head of the Egyptian Electricity Holding Company, warned of the importance of resolving this issue so that Egypt doesn’t suffer a blackout.

Freedom and Justice explains the petrol shortage as a political tool by Shafiq's campaign. It leads its report with: "The feloul's candidate ignites the petrol war." It explains that the timing, so close to the presidential runoff, is meant to create instability and lead people to voting for a strongman candidate like Shafiq.

 via www.egyptindependent.com

How to safeguard the revolution in Egypt? An outsider’s perspective

Via Euobserver, by Koert Debeuf

Two days before the presidential elections, I had a dinner in my place with some revolutionaries and bloggers. One of them, Bassem Sabry, suddenly asked the question: “What are we going to do if it’s a run-off between Morsi and Shafiq?” A moment of silence followed. Nobody had really thought this could have been a possibility. Voting for Morsi would give the Muslim Brotherhood all the power in Egypt, a secular’s worst nightmare. Voting for Shafiq, the last Prime Minister of Mubarak, would turn the revolution back to square one, a revolutionary’s worst nightmare.

But here we are. The worst case scenario for the secular revolutionaries is today’s reality. How could that happen? The answer is quite obvious: fragmentation. It was fragmentation that led to the defeat in the Parliamentary elections, earlier this year, and it is fragmentation that blocked revolutionary candidates to make it to the second round of the presidential elections. If they would have combined forces, they would have easily made it. But for some reason, every revolutionary wants to become the next President of Egypt.

So what to do now? Boycotting the run-off is useless. If you don’t participate in the election you have no right to speak afterwards. Counting on a new revolution, in case there has been no electoral fraud, is strange. You cannot demand for democratic elections and refuse to recognize the results if you don’t like them. Even not if you profoundly dislike the results. Doing nothing at all, finally, and giving everybody the freedom to vote for the candidate he dislikes the least, is the worst strategy as it throws away the power of all revolutionary votes combined and it leaves the revolution with empty hands.

In my opinion, there is only one way to safeguard the revolution: think strategically and negotiate! Neither Morsi, nor Shafiq are sure about winning the presidency. So no doubt both of them are desperate for any proposal that could lead them to victory. With some 40% of the votes, the revolutionary power and thus leverage is much bigger, than most might imagine. Here lies the opportunity. For once, the other candidates should stick together. As one block they should offer their support in exchange for non-negotiable conditions. The secular/revolutionaries must be guaranteed on paper 1) the vice-president, 2) the prime minister, 3) half of the government ministries, 4) half plus one of the Constitutional Committee 5) all decisions will be signed by both the president and the vice-president. This is politics. This is democracy.

Public statements will not safeguard the revolution, but tough negotiations can. I would first go to Mohamed Morsi with this package. If he agrees, the power of the Muslim Brotherhood and the new President of Egypt will be seriously reduced. But he will realise, this is the only way to unite the country again and make it move forward. If he refuses, it means that not Egypt but the Muslim Brotherhood is on top of his agenda. In that case, go with the same package to Shafiq.

Is this package the ultimate guarantee that the voice of the revolution will always be heard? Perhaps not, but if one of the candidates agrees, signs the paper and announces this publicly during the campaign, he cannot act as it doesn’t exist, once he is elected. It will give the revolutionary forces the opportunity to safeguard what millions of Egyptians have been fighting for. If the next President of Egypt breaks his promises, then and only then a second revolution can start again.

via blogs.euobserver.com

A Walk Through a Tunnel at the Rafah Crossing Into Gaza

Via NY Times, By Ruqaya Izzidien 

A tunnel from Egypt to Gaza. Although the border is now open to travelers, even basic goods are moved through the tunnels.

RAFAH, Egypt — They stood just outside the gates of the Rafah crossing on the Egyptian side of the border with Gaza, a couple of inconspicuous Bedouin men waiting for people to be denied entry. As the disappointed travelers retreated, the Bedouins whispered from behind the gates: “You want to go to the tunnels? Fifty dollars.” Their gaze fixed on the Egyptian border police officers, who turn a blind eye to the Bedouins so long as they do not mention the tunnels within earshot.

Technically illegal in Egypt, the tunnels lie at the heart of life and commerce here. Even though Gaza’s border with Egypt was officially reopened for travelers last year, Gaza still depends on the tunnels for most of the basics, like food, building materials and clothes, as well as luxuries like electronics, cars and even wedding dresses.

The underground passageways are concealed in a “tunnel village” that I set out to find. It was not all that hard: on the main road to the Rafah crossing, just turn left at the purple bougainvillea. This road leads through a village of shut doors and few shops. The air is heavy with the sandy dust from the hundreds of excavations; everything melts into a brown haze, so it is difficult to see 25 feet ahead.

Stony tracks lead to clusters of houses shut off from the street by heavy shutters. In time, I negotiated my way into a narrow tunnel lined with heavy wood, whose entrance was hidden in a garden shed.

As I stepped onto three wobbly bricks leading into the tunnel, the first thing I heard was “Watch your head.” This phrase would be repeated many times during the 1,000-foot walk to the Gaza side. After about the 10th warning, I yelled up the tunnel, “I’m much more worried about being bombed than grazing my head!” My guide, who, like the others I spoke with here, refused to give his name for fear of the authorities, guffawed. It took him half a minute to recover from the “ridiculousness” of my concern.

There were four more workers just inside the mouth of the tunnel. As they crouched on the ground, intertwined with the pulley system, the workers transported crushed stones that would be used to make bricks for construction in Gaza. It is a painstaking process. The stones arrive by the ton and have to be loaded by hand into the tunnel, where they are placed in large blue plastic baskets that are connected to form a long train.

Empty baskets whizzed past us and jolted to a stop at the tunnel’s entrance.

“This is our life,” said one of the workers, his face iced in a layer of white dust. “Life is expensive, and Rafah is even more high-priced than Cairo. So we are forced to work and live underground.”

We walked for about 100 yards, and at one point the tunnel opened up wide enough to fit a car. But for the most part we were bent double, and my guide refused to continue until my head was practically at floor level, safely out of danger of being hit (at least from above).

The tunnel is dug only six feet or so below the surface and runs almost exactly straight.

Despite their humble appearance, these tunnels — particularly the newest ones — are built with skill and precision. The wood joints are exact; the lanterns are placed strategically to allow enough light without wasting too much electricity. After hobbling along for about 300 yards, I finally saw the light at the end.

My guide told me to wait while he spoke to the tunnel’s owner.

“You have to have a permit from the Gazan government to cross,” the guide told me. “If you don’t, Hamas will fine him $1,500.”

As I waited for the owner to check that no authorities were around, two women appeared at the entrance to the tunnel. They tiptoed in, and one whispered, “I’m not sure about this” as they disappeared into the seemingly endless tunnel, flipping up their niqabs to breathe more freely.

I was beckoned out of the tunnel, and I met its owner, a Palestinian. A permanent grin etched into his dusty, weathered face, he explained how crossing into Gaza works.

“If anyone wants to cross from Egypt, via my tunnel, he has to call me up about a week in advance, and he needs to apply for a permit with Hamas,” the owner said. “From the Gazan government’s point of view, whether you cross by border or by tunnel, you need permission.”

Many Egyptians believe that, after the revolution that toppled the government last year, the Rafah crossing should be opened up for trade and complete freedom of travel, ending an economic siege on Gaza.

Gazans have always considered the tunnels a legitimate trade and passenger route, one that is necessary for survival in light of the blockade. The Israeli government views the tunnels as an illegal smuggling route and often targets them in airstrikes, which usually trap and kill workers.

Despite the frequent Israeli bombings and, during the era of President Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, deliberate flooding and even electrocutions, the tunnel workers are unfazed by — or perhaps desensitized to — the prospect of a collapse. As I briefly stepped out into Gaza, the tunnel’s owner laughed when my guide told him that I was worried about an airstrike.

Right on cue, an Israeli F-16 roared over our heads, and the owner looked up at the plane with a huge grin and mockingly beckoned its pilots to bomb where I stood. He pointed at me and shouted skyward, “She’s over here!”

Everyone exploded with laughter, and as I turned back and crouched into the tunnel to return to Egypt, the owner called out to me, “Watch your head!”

A version of this article appeared in print on May 30, 2012, on page A8 of the New York edition with the headline: A Hunched Shuffle Through an Underground Artery to Gaza.

via www.nytimes.com

BREAKING: Mubarak sons, EFG CEOs to face new trial for stock market corruption

Via Ahram Online

Mubarak's sons, Alaa Mubarak, left, and Gamal Mubarak (Photo: Reuters)

The sons of Egypt's deposed president Hosni Mubarak, Gamal and Alaa, as well as Hassan Heykal and Yasser El-Mallawany - both of whom are co-CEOs of Egyptian investment bank EFG-Hermes - are to face a new trial for corrupt stock exchange dealings, state television reported on Wednesday.

Alaa and Gamal Mubarak, already on trial with their father for corruption, will go face a criminal court along with seven other defendants, the official Nile Television reported.

 

The two brothers and their father will hear the verdict on 2 June on corruption charges in the first trial.

via english.ahram.org.eg

Egypt: Q&A on the Trial of Hosni Mubarak

Via Human Rights Watch--a rather long but very interesting and informative article. Please read on.

Hosni Mubarak, 84, became president of Egypt after the assassination of Anwar Sadat in October 1981, and served until he was ousted on February 11, 2011, following the large-scale pro-democracy protests that began on January 25 (the “January 25 protests”). A career military officer and commander of the Egyptian Air Force, he had been named vice-president in 1975.

1. What are the charges against Mubarak?

Mubarak is charged with complicity in the murder and attempted murder of hundreds of peaceful demonstrators protesting his rule in Cairo, Alexandria, Suez, and several other Egyptian governorates between January 25 and January 31, 2011, under Articles 40(2), 45, 230, 231, and 235 of the Egyptian Penal Code. Although there were further injuries and deaths in the continuing protests against Mubarak’s rule after January 31 and prior to his departure, the charges only concern events though January 31.

Article 40(2) establishes criminal liability for any person who agrees with another to commit a crime that takes place on the basis of such agreement. Article 45 defines “attempt” as the beginning of carrying out an act with the intent to commit a crime. Articles 230 and 231 provide that the death penalty is the punishment for premeditated murder. Article 235 specifies that the accomplices to premeditated murder shall be sentenced to death or life in prison.That said, it should be noted that Penal Code article 17 givesthe court discretion to substitute a prison sentence for a death sentence and a lesser sentence for a sentence of life in prison.

Mubarak is also charged with accepting a bribe from Hussein Salem, a resort developer who is his co-defendant, to exploit his influence and facilitate land concessions in Sharm al-Shaikh for a golf and tourism investment company Salem owns (see below).

The referral order charging Mubarak does not specify the Penal Code articles relevant to the bribery charge. Instead, the order clusters together all the Penal Code articles relevant to a range of corruption charges against Mubarak, his sons, and Salem—leaving uncertain which legal provisions apply to which defendants. The bribery charge against Mubarak appears to involve articles 103, 104, and 106 bis, which criminalize a public employee’s demand or acceptance of a bribe to perform, or cease to perform, an act within the scope of his responsibility or to use his actual or alleged influence to secure a license, concession, or benefit from a public authority.

In addition, Mubarak is charged with being an accomplice to the former petroleum minister, Sameh Fahmy, in improperly authorizing another Salem-controlled company, the East Mediterranean Gas Company, to export Egyptian natural gas to Israel for prices lower than those in the international markets, granting an illicit benefit to Salem’s company and harming public coffers. This charge appears to involve Penal Code articles 40(2) and 40(3), which establish criminal liability for agreeing with another to commit a crime or to intentionally provide assistance to another to commit the crime, as well as article 116 bis, which prohibits any public employee from intentionally harming the funds and interests of a public authority.

2. What is the significance of the trial?

This is the first trial of a former Arab head of state in an ordinary court of law in which the defendant has personally appeared in court since waves of street protests hit the Arab world in December 2010. (Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia was tried in absentia in late 2011; Saddam Hussein of Iraq was tried before a special tribunal in 2005 and 2006.) Mubarak’s trial has the potential to set a meaningful regional precedent for accountability for human rights abuses and for upholding international fa

via www.hrw.org

الفرق بين مرسئ وشفيق هو الفرق بين المصيبه والمصيبه السوده

ٍSource unkown!

The poster says the difference between Mursi and Shafik is the difference between a disaster and a worse disaster.

The open-ended test in Egypt

Via Al Arabiya, by Ghasan Charbel

Youths on the television screens are expressing the bitterness they feel as a result of the outcome of the first round of the Egyptian presidential election. They are speaking on the same screens that had once carried their dreams, slogans and fist gestures from Tahrir Square. The results of the election have put them in front of a painful or difficult choice: Either the General or the Ikhwan, i.e. either Ahmed Shafik, the last prime minister under Hosni Mubarak, or Mohamed Morsi, the candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood.

The first round could have been an opportunity to move away from this polarization. Many votes went to Hamdeen Sabahi, Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh and others went to Amr Moussa. But in the end, the ballot boxes issued their verdict: Egypt will have to choose in the run-off between the General and the Sheikh – naturally while bearing in mind that the path to the run-off remains rife with the potential for surprises.

The youths who ignited the first spark became trapped in the dream, and this is no strange matter in the history of revolutions. They thought that toppling the Mubarak regime would mean the creation of a new Egypt, a democratic, transparent and pluralistic Egypt.

They also thought that Egypt will immediately catch up with the age and that it would soon resemble what they concocted on Facebook and on the web and blogs. They were under the illusion that they shot one last time at tyranny, autocracy, corruption, isolation and the rejection of others, and that the time for radical and comprehensive change had come. They conceived that this Egypt, as it was preparing to be reborn, would resemble any other normal state in the civilized world, and that it would be in the custody of new powers.

The confusion of the youths when faced with the results was clear and evident in what they said or wrote. What happened to the revolution? Who hijacked it? Will Egypt soon need a second revolution? Where did Shafik get millions of votes, coming ahead of the Arab nationalist and Nasserist candidate Hamdeen Sabahi? What caused the existing polarization? Is it true that the elites bear some responsibility for misunderstanding what is happening in the Egyptian hinterland, and the factors that cause millions of voters to vote one way or the other? Some said that the religious factor gave Morsi five million votes, while nostalgia to security and stability, as well as fears of a theocratic state, gave Shafik a similar number of votes, more or less.

They spoke of the remnants of the banned National Party electoral machine, and the deep presence of that of the military. Others stopped at the turnout, which came less than it was expected given the importance of the battle and the stakes involved. They were struck by the fact that Morsi’s votes do not give him a mandate to implement the Muslim Brotherhood’s program, if he wins.

They pointed to the threat of the presidency, the parliament and the government all falling into hands of a single party, even if the said party were to be compelled temporarily to introduce other elements initially. Analyzing the results of the first round requires factoring in many elements: The religious factor and issues of security; fear of a return to past practices; fear of the erosion of the prestige of the state; fear of the risk posed by a theocratic state; as well as the distribution of the Salafist, liberal and Coptic votes, respectively.

Shafik needs to give out reassurances that he is not the candidate of the return to the previous era, and he has indeed begun to move in that direction. Morsi, meanwhile, needs to give out reassurances and posts, and he has indeed begun to make offers.

The coming days will be rife with maneuvering, promises and pledges. But we will have to wait before we know what

via english.alarabiya.net

Egypt presidential election: wrap-up of the revolution?

Via Open Democracy, by Soha Farouk

The run-off between Morsi and Shafiq points to one undeniable conclusion: a leaderless revolution could topple a dictator but, when it comes to the ballot boxes, it cannot remain leaderless

Eight o’clock, Cairo morning, polling stations opened their doors to the long queues of Egyptians  in orderly formation outside, waiting to cast their ballot papers in the first multi-candidate unfettered presidential elections in Egypt since the January 25 revolution. Choosing the new leader is a tough challenge for many Egyptians.

Ideally, elections should be held soon after a regime topples, within six months, to fill the legitimacy gap that follows. In Egypt, the transitional period, once promised to be six months, was extended to almost seventeen, characterized by failed governance and public depression. Public appetite for democracy has plummeted. The initial post-revolution sense of drift is becoming eclipsed by growing every day insecurities and economic problems as well as violent clashes. So turn-out for the presidential elections were poor. Apart from the call of a few political parties and activists for a boycott of SCAF’s elections, which they allege are inevitably rigged under a military rule, public political apathy cannot be ignored.

Based on the results of the elections, evidence suggests that the opinion polls are misleading and deceptive. Despite reports of declining support of Egyptians to the Islamists due to their weak parliamentarian performance, the Freedom and Justice party and the Muslim Brotherhood presidential candidate, Dr. Muhamed Mursi, came out on top in the first round of the presidential elections. In addition, the unexpected surge of Ahmed Shafiq, last prime minister of the Mubarak regime, to second ranking is more surprising still – given all the reports of his lack of popularity among voters. Ironically, Moussa and AbulFoutouh, leading the Egyptian presidential race in the public surveys, will not be heading into the second round.

The run-off between Morsi & Shafiq points to one undeniable conclusion: a leaderless revolution could topple a dictator but, when it comes to the ballot boxes, should not remain leaderless. As the vote-counting is under way, the total votes gained by the two candidates perceived as pro-revolution, Sabahi and AbulFoutouh, were more than the one attracted by Shafiq or Mursi. However, they will not be present in the run-off. The fragmentation of votes between them would not have happened if the revolutionary forces had overcome their differences and unified their powers behind one candidate.

In any eventuality, Egyptians voting in the second round of the presidential elections are caught between a rock and a hard place. Whoever will be the winner; those elections will not be a landmark in the post-revolutionary transition to democracy. It is even doubtful that the presidential elections will restore stability to the country. The fluid Egyptian environment will spark struggle between the secularists and the Islamists, the haves and have-nots, the influential military and the recalcitrant youth, impatient for change, to define a new balance of power. It's not the end of the revolution; but it may just be the beginning.

This article is the weekly-featured-column for Arab Awakening's This week's window into the Middle East.

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via www.opendemocracy.net