As the US withdraws from Afghanistan

By Azza Radwan Sedky

The US remained a dominant force in the Afghani scene for over 40 years. Today, as the withdrawal of US troops becomes imminent, we question the legacy left behind: the hardline approach the US perpetuated earlier on, then the presence of the forces for 20 years, and finally the repercussions from both the long drawn-out stay and the inevitable pullout.

After years of intrusive tactics followed by invasion and occupation, the US leaves Afghanistan having accomplished very little if anything at all. Afghanistan today, days after the withdrawal announcement, is at the mercy of the Taliban yet again, a proxy of the group the US had supported and built up. So what was the point exactly of the bloodshed and war?

Let’s go back a few decades. In the late seventies, as the Soviets forged closer ties with a new communist government in Afghanistan, the US eyed Afghanistan more closely. In July 1979, the US intelligence began assisting the Afghani guerillas, who later became better known as the Mujahidin, or the “holy warriors,” so as to stand against the Soviets. It was President Jimmy Carter who signed a "presidential finding" authorizing the CIA to spend over $500,000 to support the Mujahidin against the growing Soviet influence. Operation Cyclone was the code name for the CIA program that would arm and finance the Mujahideen in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989.

What newfound information tells us is that, by helping the Mujahidin stand against the Soviets, the US intended to draw them into a war in Afghanistan.  According to David N. Gibbs in “Reassessing Soviet Motives for Invading Afghanistan,” Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security advisor to President Carter at the time of the Soviet invasion, said, “We now have the opportunity of giving the USSR its Vietnam War,” a prolonged crisis that would seep strength and attention.

True to Brzezinski’s premonition, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan came December of the same year. Though “It was widely believed that the Soviets sought to use Afghanistan as a strategic springboard for further offensive action — with the ultimate aim of controlling the oil resources of the Persian Gulf,” historical declassified documents say the motives of the Soviets were defensive ones rather than offensive ones. In addition to supporting the Afghani communist government, since Afghanistan bordered the USSR, the Soviets feared that the US might establish bases in the area. Gibbs compares the proximity of Afghanistan to the USSR to the way United States views Mexico, a security concern of special importance.

From then on the US collaborated with the Mujahidin and provided them with aid and weapons hardly anticipating that the same Mujahidin will turn on their great providers eventually.

The Mujahidin first focused their resistance against the “infidels,” the Soviets. But by the time the Soviets left Afghanistan in 1989, the Mujahidin had gained organization, strength, and combat potential. Receiving large supplies of arms, via Pakistan, provided by the US and other countries, the Mujahidin focused their momentum and hatred towards non-Muslims and Christians alike.

The Mujahidin morphed into various offshoots including the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Osama bin Laden fought amongst the Mujahidin against the Soviets only to return to Afghanistan and establish Al Qaeda in the mid nineties with an abhorrent hate towards the US. Soon Al Qaeda bombed US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, bombed the USS Cole in Yemen, and finally reached inside the US itself with the first World Trade Centre bombing in 1993, then the September 11, 2001, attacks that killed 3,000 persons in 2001.

This was followed by an all out war against Afghanistan when George Bush, Jr., announced his “war against terrorism,” in the hopes of getting rid of those who harbored Bin Laden. From then on, the US had thousands of US troops in Afghanistan for twenty years and poured billions of dollars to fight the Taliban. The human cost was extreme, too, with an average of 3,000 lives of American troops lost.

This mid-April President Biden announced the end of the presence of US troops in Afghanistan. When asked if the Taliban takeover was inevitable, he disagreed saying, that “the Taliban force of approximately 75,000 fighters is no match for the 300,000 Afghan security forces.”

However, the Taliban have gained more territory since the US announced its intent to withdraw from Afghanistan; they’ve seized Kandahar in the south and many districts in the north, and, according to the Taliban, themselves, they control 85 percent of Afghanistan territory and key border crossings to Iran and Turkmenistan. The low morale amongst the Afghani troops had them leave districts to the Taliban to take over without a fight. Even some senior provincial officials left the Northeastern districts and headed for the capital Kabul. Refuting President Biden’s projection, the Taliban are back in full force as though the last 40 years of US intervention did not happen.

The legacy the US leaves behind in war-torn Afghanistan is of misery and despair. What is happening in Afghanistan is no different from what happened in Vietnam in the 70s and Iraq in 2011. Military interventions wreak havoc with the fate of the occupied country and the lives of its people only to be soon followed by total indifference when the environment becomes too dangerous for the occupants or when they realize, rather too late, the futility of their endeavours.

It is a recurrent tragedy.